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Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate
Law*
Lynn A. Stout

Abstract
Academics, reformers, and business leaders all yearn for a single,
objective, easy-to-readmeasure of corporateperformance that can be used to
judge the quality of public corporation law andpractice. This collective desire
is so powerful that it has led many commentators to grab onto the first
marginallyplausible candidate: shareprice.
Contemporary economic and corporate theory, as well as recent business
history, nevertheless warn us against unthinking acceptance of shareprice as a
measure of corporateperformance. This Essay offers a briefreminder of some
of the many reasons why stock prices often fail to reflect true corporate
performance, including the problem of private information; obstacles to
effective arbitrage; investors' cognitive defects and biases; options theory and
the problem of multiple residual claimants; and the problem of corporate
spillover effects that erode diversified shareholders' returns. These
considerations argue against assuming there is a tight connection between
stock prices and underlying corporate wealth generation. A corporation or a
corporate law system designed around the philosophy that "anything that
raisesshare price is good" is likely to produce afirm that cooks its books; that
avoids long-term projects that won't appeal to unsophisticated investors; that
chases after investmentfads andfancies; that tries to opportunisticallyexploit
creditors, employees, and customers; and that pursues business strategies that
harm its diversifiedshareholders' other investment interests.
The Essay concludes that, if we allow our desire for a universal
performance measure to blind us to the fallibility of shareprice, we court costly
error. The Essay examines three recent examples of just such erroneous
triumphs of hope over experience: the rise andfall of the Revlon doctrine; the
1990s infatuation with options-basedexecutive compensation; and academics'
currentpreoccupation with event studies, regressions on Tobin's Q, and other
Editor's note: This Article was submitted as a part of the Klein Criteria Project and scheduled for
publication with the Berkeley Business Law Journal,Volume 2, Number 1 (Symposium Issue). See Paul
S. Edwards & Mitu Gulati, Foreword: The Klein Criteria Project, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2005);
William Klein, Criteriafor Good Laws of Business Association, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 13 (2005). Due
to an editorial oversight, it is only now being published. The Berkeley Business Law Journalregrets this
oversight and apologizes for any confusion.
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forms of empirical scholarship that attempt to judge the quality of corporate
law andpractice accordingto changes in shareprice.
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Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate
Law
Lynn A. Stout
Dreams are useful. Dreams can inspire people to achieve what they
otherwise would not achieve and to endure what they otherwise could not
endure. Without dreams, we might never have developed democracy,
penicillin, or the electric toothbrush.
Dreams also are sometimes dangerous. Consider the case of Belgian
shoemaker Vincent De Groof. De Groof dreamed of flying, and built a machine
with wings that flapped like a bird's. In 1874, De Groof arranged for a hot air
balloon to carry him aloft in his omithopter and release him in mid-air. Sadly,
De Groof s dream of flight proved only a dream. He fell to his death.'
Something similar, if less fatal, happened to many of us in the corporate
world in the 1980s and 1990s. Our dangerous dream was not the dream of
flight. Rather, it was the dream of finding a single, objective, accurate, easy-toobserve criterion for corporate performance that could be used to gauge the
quality of law and practice.
THE

DREAM OF MEASURABILITY

To understand the lure of the dream, consider the nature of the modem
corporation. The typical public company buys and sells dozens of products and
services in hundreds of markets. It pursues programs and projects that unfold
over years or even decades, under conditions of enormous risk and uncertainty.
It has several directors, scores of executives, hundreds of employees, thousands
of shareholders, and millions of customers. Its actions affect not only these
individuals but many others as well. (Consider how Union Carbide, Exxon, and
Enron affected lives in Bhopal, Prince William Sound, and Houston,
respectively.)
How are we to judge the performance and impact of such large, complex,
and long-lived entities? What criteria can we adopt to determine whether the
laws we use to regulate and govern them-including statutes, case law,
charters, by-laws, and private contracts-are good ones?
In his essay Criteriafor Good Laws of Business Association, which

provides the foundation for this Symposium, Professor William Klein outlines
a rather large number of possible goals and objectives we might try to

1. See ROB ALCRAFT, FLIGHT 5 (2004) (recounting De Groof s story).
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accomplish through business law. 2 One possible goal is notably missing from
Professor Klein's list: that good business law maximize stock price.
On first inspection this omission seems shocking. Although one can
understand why stock price is not terribly relevant for business entities that do
not have publicly traded shares, it has become commonplace for modem
observers to assume that for public corporations, maximizing share price is an
important and indeed possibly the only legitimate business objective. Thus
reformers and investor groups exhort corporate directors to focus on
"shareholder value," firms grant their executives lavish stock option packages
to "incentivize" them to raise stock price, and academics routinely judge the
quality of changes in corporate law and practice according to how those
changes affect the market price for shares. The assumption that stock price
reflects corporate performance is so deeply ingrained that for many it has
become a mental habit, rarely subject to critical analysis.
Nevertheless, "maximizing share price" never appears on Professor Klein's
list as a goal of business law. I suspect it does not for a very sensible reason. In
brief, it is only the investor who plans to sell her shares today who views
maximizing share price as a goal in itself. For the rest of us, a higher stock
price today is not an end but only a means to end, in the form of a yardstick we
can use to gauge long-term corporate performance.
Yardsticks are very useful tools, especially if they are easy to read. But it is
important to remember that ease of use is not the only thing we should look for
in a yardstick. We should also make sure it measures the thing we want to
measure. In other words, the yardstick must be relevant. Judging corporate law
according to a particular metric simply because the metric is easy to observe
would be as foolish as selecting a doctor according to height because height is
easy to measure, while medical skill, attention to detail, and empathy are not.
Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, a number of powerful interests in the
business world would love to find a single, objective, easy-to-read criterion
against which to measure corporate performance. Academics would like to find
such a criterion, because they could run regressions to identify the best
corporate rules and structures, and publish articles announcing their findings.
Consultants would like such a criterion, because they could translate the
academics' findings into advice they could provide (for a healthy fee, of
course) to investors, executives, and directors. Reformers and regulators would
like such a criterion, because they could identify sub-par rules and firms, and
push for changes in law and practice to improve them.
With so many different and powerful groups hoping to find an easy way to
calculate the quality of corporate law and practice, it was perhaps inevitable the

2. William Klein, Criteriafor Good Laws of Business Association, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 13
(2005).
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dream would take on a life of its own. The notion that we can straightforwardly
measure corporate performance is very appealing. So appealing, it is easy to
understand why many who study or work in the business world would leap to
embrace the first plausible candidate to come along. That candidate, of course,
was share price.
SHARE PRICE AS A METRIC OF CORPORATE PERFORMANCE

It is easy for us to forget, today, that for much of the 20th century, scholars
and business leaders alike viewed stock prices as only very weak indicators of
business performance. In their 1932 classic The Modern Corporation and
Private Property, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means noted dryly that "the
values accorded to securities on the faith of market quotations are only 'paper'3
and perhaps ought not to be invested with any great amounts of significance."
John Maynard Keynes had an even more cynical view. In his 1936 The General
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Keynes famously described the

stock market
as a "beauty contest" in which prices were largely disconnected
4
from value.
This sort of skepticism about the relationship between stock price and
corporate value largely disappeared during the 1960s and 1970s. The
disappearance can be traced in large part to the development, and subsequent
academic promotion, of two fundamental ideas in modem corporate finance.
The first fundamental idea is the idea of an "efficient" stock market.
According to efficient market theory, stock prices in a liquid market
incorporate new information quickly and accurately. So quickly and accurately,
in fact, that the market price of a company's shares offers the best possible
estimate of the underlying economic value of shareholders' equity interest in
the firm.5
The second fundamental idea might be termed the "principal-agent" model
of the firm. As commonly employed, the principal-agent model views the
shareholders in a corporation as the "principals" of the firm who should benefit
from the firm's profits. Other groups that participate in corporations-including
creditors, executives, and rank and-file employees-are viewed as outsiders or
"agents" who ought to extract from the firm only the payments their contracts
legally entitle them to extract. The principal-agent model as a result views
shareholders as the sole residual claimants in corporations. This implies that

3.

ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY 262 (1932).
4. JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 156 (1936).
5. For general surveys of the theory of efficient markets, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (7th ed. 2003); BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK

DOWN WALL STREET (7th ed. 1999); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
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any increase in the total value of the firm will produce an equivalent increase in
the value of shareholder equity, while a decline in firm value produces an
identical decline in shareholder wealth.6
Taken together, efficient market theory and the principal-agent model
provide the essential ingredients for an almost irresistibly appealing final
product-an apparently accurate, objective, and easy way to calculate corporate
performance. All we need to do is observe stock price. Efficient market theory
and the principal-agent model accordingly provide the foundation for one of the
most common and powerful (if often unspoken) assumptions in contemporary
discussions of corporate law: the assumption that anything that raises share
price must be good.

How nice if this were true. How disappointing that stock prices do not, in
fact, accurately capture corporate value.
FIVE LESSONS ON THE FALLIBILITY OF SHARE PRICE

Twenty years ago, the claim that stock prices do not necessarily measure
corporate performance might have provoked howls of protest from many
readers. Especially during the mid-1980s, when efficient market theory and the
principal-agent model were at their zenith, finance theorists and corporate
scholars often embraced the notion that stock prices capture economic value
with a passion that bordered on the religious.
Our collective confidence in the accuracy of stock prices was badly shaken,
however, on October 19, 1987, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average
inexplicably lost 23 percent of its value in a single trading session. (The value
appeared again, equally mysteriously, a few months later). In 2000, the
dramatic collapse of the 1990s tech stock bubble further undermined many
observers' trust in market prices. Most recently, we have had to contend with a
series of high-profile cases like Enron and Global Crossing, in which
corporations saw their share price first soar beyond any sane estimate of value
and then crash as forcefully (and, in some cases, as fatally) as De Groof's
ornithopter.
Such object lessons have taken their toll on most people's faith in the
strength of the supposed connection between stock prices and corporate
performance. They have also spurred academics to produce not one, but
several, important literatures that examine how and why stock prices often fail
to accurately measure underlying corporate value. Most readers are probably
familiar with one or more of these literatures. My guess is that, if pressed, most
also would concede stock prices often bear only a weak relationship to

6.

For discussions of the principal-agent model, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL,

THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36-39 (1991); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team ProductionTheory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 261-65 (1999).
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corporate performance.
But at least a few die-hard souls might defend the market's efficiency.
Many others might be tempted to suggest that stock prices, while imperfect,
nevertheless capture value reasonably accurately much of the time. Still others
would squirm uncomfortably and change the subject. Such is the power of the
dream of measurability to capture our hearts.
In both business and scholarship, however, it is important to use our heads.
We may hope for a single, objective, accurate, easy-to-read measure of
corporate performance. Hope nevertheless is not the same thing as reality. For
readers romantic enough to cling to the dream of measuring corporate
performance by stock price, I offer below a brief reminder of some of the many
reasons why contemporary economic and corporate scholarship teaches us that
stock prices often fail to reflect true corporate value.
1. The Problem of PrivateInformation
Even the most zealous defenders of efficient market theory usually concede
that stock prices do not fully reflect "private" information that is not available
to the investing public. In7 the parlance of finance economics, the market is at
best semi-strong efficient.
Yet once we admit that prices do not incorporate private information, we
are forced into a second admission: prices will often fail to reflect information
that is valuable, even essential, to valuing firms. Consider the classic and rather
common example of nonpublic information that the company's books are being
cooked.
Some readers might object that the sort of price inaccuracy that results from
private information is likely to persist only for the short term. Eventually, the
good--or bad-news must come out. But in today's stock market, many
influential investors (including both outsiders like hedge funds and mutual
funds and insiders like executives whose options are about to vest) expect to
hold their stock for only a few weeks or months. As a result, short term
inaccuracies can lead to long term distortions in corporate strategy and policy.
2. Obstacles to Arbitrage
Efficient market theory relies on arbitrage to incorporate new information
quickly and fully into market price. Modem finance economists have come to
believe, however, that in real life, stock traders often face serious obstacles to
arbitrage, including but not limited to capital constraints, short sales

7. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FiN. 383 (1970) (distinguishing between between strong and semi-strong efficiency).
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8
restrictions, borrowing constraints, and holding period constraints.
Once we recognize that there are limits to arbitrage, we must also recognize
that some kinds of "public" information--especially information that is
difficult for average investors to obtain or understand-will tend to be
incorporated into market prices only slowly and incompletely. Many
sophisticated observers believe, for example, that during the 1990s, the prices
of many technology firms' shares failed to fully reflect publicly available
information about the dilutive effects of employee stock options. Again, the
result was significant inaccuracies in stock prices that persisted long enough to
seriously distort investment strategy, executive compensation, and other
important business decisions.

3. BehavioralFinanceand Investor Irrationality

The notion that stock prices accurately measure the value of shareholders'
equity depends, at a very fundamental level, on an underlying belief that
investors value stocks by making rational estimates of future risks and returns.
Contemporary economists, however, increasingly question investor rationality
on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The hottest new field in finance is
"behavioral finance"--the study of how
investors' emotions and cognitive
9
biases systematically distort stock prices.
The rise of behavioral finance has deep-seated implications not only for
finance economists, but for corporate governance experts as well. A stock
market driven by manias and cognitive quirks can hardly provide a reliable
basis for gauging corporate performance. (Remember Pets.com?)
4. Options Theory, Team Production,and the Problem of Multiple Residual
Claimants

Even if stock prices accurately captured the economic value of shareholder
equity, they would be a good measure of corporate performance only if changes
in equity value necessarily mirrored changes in aggregate firm value. The
principal-agent model addresses this issue by "assuming the can opener"-that
is, by assuming that shareholders are the sole residual claimants in
corporations.
Modern options theory and team production theory both teach that this
assumption is incorrect. Options theory demonstrates that creditors are also
potential residual claimants and residual risk bearers in firms. As a result,
8. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the
New Finance,28 J. CORP. L. 635, 651-59 (2003) (discussing theory and evidence of limits to arbitrage).
9. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); ANDREI SHLEIFER,
INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000). For a general survey, see
Stout, supra note 8 at 659-66.
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shareholders can increase the economic value of their equity interest simply by
extracting value from creditors. For example, they can pursue high-risk
raise share price while degrading the quality and value of the
strategies that
10
debt.
firm's
In the same vein, team production theory teaches that economic production
often requires executives, employees, customers, and other nonshareholder
groups to make firm-specific investments (e.g., sunk cost investments of time
or effort, or investments in knowledge, skills, or relationships uniquely
specialized to a particular firm). Often these firm-specific investments cannot
be protected with formal contracts. As a result, nonshareholder constituencies
end up being residual claimants and risk bearers."
This means, again, that shareholders can raise stock price not only by
increasing the value of the firm as a whole, but also by extracting wealth from
nonshareholder constituencies. Oracle's recent purchase of competitor
PeopleSoft offers an example of just such a rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul strategy.
PeopleSoft's shareholders earned a modest premium from the sale. Because
Oracle plans to stop selling many of PeopleSoft's products and lay off much of
its workforce, much of the gain seems likely to come from PeopleSoft's
employees and customers.
5. Share Priceand the DiversifiedShareholder
So far the discussion has focused on why stock prices fail to accurately
capture the economic value of shareholder equity (as predicted by efficient
market theory) and why changes in shareholder equity often fail to mirror
changes in the overall value of the firm (as assumed by the principal-agent
model). Yet even if these problems did not exist--even if we ignore evidence
and reason, and assume efficient market theory and the principal-agent model
accurately describe modern corporations-we still cannot safely assume that
share price measures corporate performance for diversified shareholders. This
is because diversified shareholders own stocks in many firms and in many
industries. They also often own corporate bonds, government bonds, and real
estate. If individuals, they "own" and usually invest in their own human capital
(knowledge and skills they sell to employers). As a result, diversified investors
worry about business strategies that increase the value of one of their
investments by harming the value of others. For example, diversified
shareholders have mixed emotions about corporate takeovers, which provide
gains for target shareholders but often depress the prices of bidding firms. They

10. For a general discussion of the implications of options theory for the principal-agent model, see
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, DirectorAccountability and the MediatingRole of the Corporate
Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403,411-14 (2001).
11. See generally Blair & Stout, supranote 6.

Berkeley Business Law Journal

Vol. 3.1, 2005

worry about high-risk strategies that raise share price while devaluing debt.
They are distressed when the companies they invest in shy away from investing
in research or employee training that provides valuable spillover benefits to
other companies they also invest in. And they worry when their financial
capital is managed in a way that harms their human capital-for example, when
corporations raise share price by reducing employee wages or polluting the
environment. 12
Enron offers a wonderful example of how policies that ruthlessly maximize
the price of one firm often produce spillover effects that harm diversified
investors' other interests. By trading risky energy derivatives, Enron for many
years achieved superlative returns on its shares. Eventually, however, its
gambling luck ran out, and the firm was tipped into insolvency. Most of the
resulting losses were borne not by Enron stockholders (many of whom made
enormous amounts of money over the years) but by Enron bondholders,
customers, counterparties, and employees, along with the residents of Houston,
Texas.
SHOULD WE ABANDON THE DREAM OF MEASURABILITY?

At this point, I suspect that even readers accustomed to casually assuming
that raising stock price is a good criterion for corporate law may be ready to cry
"uncle," and concede that stock prices often bear only a very loose connection
to corporate value. (True believers who are not yet ready to concede this are
invited to consider a variety of other arguments that, given space constraints, I
13
have not explored here.)
This is not to say that stock prices are utterly unconnected to corporate
performance. But the connection seems very loose indeed. Nobel Prize winner
Fischer Black was an early believer in efficient market theory who lost his faith
with age and experience. Black may have put it best when he suggested that
one might define an efficient market "as one in which price is within a factor of
two of value, i.e., the price is more than half of value and less than twice
14
value."
Nevertheless, some might protest, isn't share price still the best of all
possible performance yardsticks? Don't we need a single objective criterion?
Without a good yardstick to measure their performance, won't corporate

12. See generally JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY
CAPITALISM: How INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC
(2000); ROBERT A.G. MONKS, THE NEW GLOBAL INVESTORS: How SHAREHOLDERS CAN UNLOCK
SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY WORLDWIDE (2001).

13. For example, a large and growing literature on how heterogeneous expectations affect asset
prices further undermines the supposed connection between stock price and economic value. See
generally Stout, supra note 8, at 639-50 (discussing heterogeneous expectations literature).
14. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986).
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officers and directors run amok? Doesn't that "agency cost" problem justify our
using share price as a rubric despite its limitations?
Maybe. But maybe not. As we have seen, a corporation run according to the
philosophy that "anything that raises share price is good" is a corporation that
will cook its books; a corporation that will fail to invest in projects or programs
that cannot be understood and appreciated by unsophisticated investors; a
corporation that will chase after investment fads and fancies; a corporation that
will raise share price by opportunistically exploiting its creditors, employees,
and customers; and a corporation that will pursue strategies that harm its
diversified shareholders' other investment interests.
In other words, we should not let our dream of a universal criterion for
measuring corporate performance blind us to the reality that stock price is at
best a highly imperfect measure. If we allow wishful thinking to trump
common sense, we court error. Recent business history offers several examples
of such triumphs of hope over experience.
1. The Revlon Doctrine

The Delaware judiciary is renowned for its detailed knowledge of corporate
law, theory, and practice. Delaware judges enjoy well-deserved reputations for
business insight and expertise. As a result, it is no surprise that the Delaware
judiciary was one of the first groups in the business world to fully grasp the
implications of combining efficient market theory with the principal-agent
mode, and to jump aboard the "price equals value" bandwagon. It is also no
surprise that the Delaware judiciary was among the first groups to realize its
error and jump off.
The bandwagon leap took place, of course, in 1985, when the Delaware
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
ForbesHoldings, Inc. 15 In that case, the Court held that the directors of a public
company who were seeking to arrange the sale of the firm to a privately-held
concern had a fiduciary duty to try to get the highest possible price in the sale
without considering effects on nonshareholder constituencies. This was
necessary, the Court observed, to ensure "the maximization of the company's
16
value."'

Before Revlon, Delaware case law explicitly granted directors considerable
leeway to resist premium takeover bids on any number of grounds, including
concerns about how the takeover might affect nonshareholders and the belief
that the offer, while higher than market, was nevertheless "too low."' 17 By
rejecting such arguments, Revlon seemed a triumph of "stock price equals

15. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
16. Id. at 182.
17. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

Berkeley Business Law Journal

Vol. 3.1, 2005

corporate value" thinking.
The triumph did not last long. Only four years later, after a period of
doctrinal confusion, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Paramount
Communications v. Time, Inc., a case holding that that the Revlon doctrine
only applied in circumstances so narrow and avoidable that the doctrine
essentially has been left for dead. Some theorists may still mourn Revlon's
passing. But in the eyes of the Delaware judiciary, Revlon was a mistake.
2. The Stock Option Fad
Revlon involved a short-lived and relatively inexpensive judicial flirtation
with the idea that stock price equals value. In a second case, the infatuation has
proven far more costly. This is the case of executive compensation.
During the 1980s and 1990s, efficient market theory and the principal-agent
model led a number of influential corporate commentators and interest groups
to enthusiastically endorse the use of stock options as a means of "bonding"
executives' interests to those of shareholders. After all, if any rise in stock price
necessarily reflects an equivalent increase the corporate value, what better way
to "incentivize" executives to act efficiently? Executives, seeing how options
had made many of their peers wealthy beyond their most avaricious dreams,
happily went along with the program.
The results are now widely perceived to have been something of a disaster.
Options are no longer viewed as the "silver bullet" solution to lagging
corporate performance. Instead, they are associated with grossly excessive
CEO pay packages, financial frauds and misstatements, and a host of scandals
ranging from Enron's collapse to Disney's $140 million severance package
paid departing executive Michael Ovitz.
The rise and fall of options provides a useful object lesson in how the
illusion of measurability lured an entire business generation into a radical and
unfortunate restructuring of compensation practices. Luckily, as in the case of
Revlon, the damage does not appear to be irreversible. Options remain an
important and legitimate part of many executive compensation packages.
Nevertheless, the headlong enthusiasm we saw in the 1990s has largely
dissipated, and options grants have declined significantly.
3. "Empirical" CorporateGovernance Scholarship
Revlon and stock options illustrate nicely how lawmakers and business
leaders, respectively, have each at some point fallen prey to "stock price equals
value" thinking. There is a third group, however, for whom this idea has proven
even more alluring. That group is academics.

18.

571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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During the 1980s and 1990s, finance theorists and corporate law scholars
embraced the notion that stock prices measure corporate value with far greater
enthusiasm than the business world itself ever did. They have continued to
cling to the idea far more tightly. For evidence of our shallow learning curve,
we need look no further than the current enthusiasm for "empirical" studies of
corporate governance.
There are a variety of empirical approaches one can adopt to analyze
corporate law. But the most popular these days seem to be studies that try to
identify good corporate law rules and practices by looking to stock price as a
measure of corporate performance. For example, many empirical scholars use
"event studies" that evaluate changes in corporate rules and structures
according to whether they are statistically associated with an increase or
decrease in share price) 9 Another increasingly popular technique is to employ
some version of "Tobin's Q," a ratio that attempts to identify firms with good
prospects by looking at the extent
to which their share price exceeds the per20
share book value of their assets.
Corporate scholars have sacrificed thousands of hours, trees, and IQ points
to both sorts of endeavors. These sorts of empirical studies nevertheless have
largely failed to produce any very significant results-that is, results that are
both strong, and replicated in other studies by other authors.
Instead, we have seen scores of papers that find various aspects of corporate
law to be only very weakly associated with better stock performance or higher
Tobin's Q-often so weakly that the results are not statistically significant. 21 A
very few studies have reported strong results. Given the sheer number of
regressions run, however, one would expect to see occasional strong results as a
matter of random chance. The unreliability of these outliers is further
highlighted by the fact that other researchers often cannot replicate them. For
example, a recent and highly-publicized study reported that in 1996, firms
incorporated in Delaware had a Tobin's Q that was as much as 5% higher than
similar firms incorporated in other states. 22 This finding was interpreted in the
23
popular press as a "no-brainer" prescription for reincorporating in Delaware.
Only a few years later, a different researcher ran a similar study, and found that
the impressive "Delaware effect" had disappeared.2 4
19. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I:
Studies of CorporateLaw, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 380 (2002).

Empirical

20. See, e.g., Robert Dames, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525
(2001); Paul Gompers et al., CorporateGovernanceandEquity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
21. See, e.g., studies cited in Stout, supra note 8, at n.97; see also Jill Fisch, Measuring Efficiency
in CorporateLaw: The Role of Shareholder Primacy 4 (2005) (manuscript on file with author) ("[F]or
the most part, empirical studies have failed to produce a convincing answer to the efficiency question.").
22. Daines, supra note 20, at 533.
23. Guhan Subramanian, The DisappearingDelawareEffect, 20 J.L. ECON & ORG. 32, 34 (2004)
(discussing media response to Daines's study).
24. Id.
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There are a number of possible explanations for such disappointing and
25
ephemeral results. One obvious possibility, however, is that researchers who
rely on stock price to measure economic performance are simply using too
limited a metric. This might explain an enduring puzzle surrounding one of the
few types of event studies that have produced strong and consistent results:
event studies of how takeover bids affect target firm prices. Not surprisingly,
researchers generally find that a takeover bid is associated with an increase in
the market price for the target firm's shares. (This phenomenon is so obvious to
those in the business world one cannot help but wonder who first thought it
worthwhile to "test" it.) Nevertheless, this apparent increase in corporate
"value" has not been reliably replicated in accounting studies, many of which
have found that takeovers have no significant effect on target firm earnings or
26
performance.
Despite this less-than-stellar track record, and despite the extensive
theoretical and empirical literature undermining efficient market theory and the
principal-agent model, academic enthusiasm for stock-based empirical studies
persists. I expect that part of the reason lies in the fact that academic work is
just that-academic. Judges make decisions that actually affect others' risks
and returns. Business people make choices that affect not only others' risks and
returns, but their own as well. Academics can speculate about what makes good
corporate law all day long, and never have to worry about doing significant
damage.
Nevertheless, there is an opportunity cost to empirical scholarship that
relies on share price to accurately measure value. The cost may be small, but it
is worth thinking about--especially for those of us who are scholars.
CONCLUSION

In Criteriafor Good Laws of Business Association, Professor William
Klein identifies no fewer than thirty different goals or objectives that one might
seek to achieve through corporate law. 27 It would be natural for such a hodgepodge to provoke irritation. With so many possible goals to choose among, how
are we to set priorities and identify the most important? What do we do when
we disagree in our goals? What do we do when the goals conflict with each
another?

25. For example, much of corporate law is endogenous, meaning that firms can choose what sorts
of rules they will operate under. If different firms choose different rules that are optimal for them, we
should expect to see variation in practice that is unaccompanied by systematic variation in performance.
26. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597, 605

(1989) ("[A]ccounting studies also find little evidence of profitability gains from mergers."); Roberta
Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. REG. 119, 124-25 (1992)

("[T]he ex-post performance findings are also mixed.").
27. Klein, supra note 2, at 18-24.

Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law

Life would be so much easier if we could identify a single, universallyaccepted criterion against which to gauge corporate law and practice. Professor
Klein refuses to identify such a criterion, and he is correct in his refusal. His
laundry list reflects the complex realities of the business world, where the
consequences of any particular decision are often opaque, widespread,
multifaceted, and played out over long periods of time. In the real world, we
lack a single accurate metric to gauge corporate performance.
We must make do instead with a variety of sometimes-conflicting goals and
rules of thumb-give shareholders a decent return; take care of your
employees; keep the customer satisfied; don't take on too much risk; grow the
business. It is a messy, inefficient, inexact system. Still it has one remarkable
advantage. History has proven it works.
We should think twice, or even three times, before abandoning Professor
Klein's laundry list in favor of a single rubric like "maximize share price." For
everyone except the investor who plans to sell today, a higher share price is
only a means to an end-not an end in itself. The ultimate end is a better
corporation, whatever criteria we may use to judge "better." Someday we may
indeed devise a single, objective, accurate, easy-to-read measure of business
performance. We did eventually build machines that allow us to fly.
But De Groof s ornithopter was not such a flying machine. And stock price
is not the universal criterion for good corporate law that we dream of.

